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UK ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES FOR
LEGAL PRACTICE: EMERGING MODELS AND
LESSONS FOR THE US
JUDITH A. MCMORROW*
ABSTRACT
Alternative Business Structure (ABS) law firms in the United Kingdom allow
for non-lawyer owners and investors. This Article analyzes several new U.K.
ABS law firms and offers an optimistic assessment of the benefits of these new
firm models. ABS firms have created systems that improve legal services for the
target clients and have mitigated the negative aspects of lawyer-centric thinking
that pervades many traditional firms. ABS firm structure has provided access to
capital to allow for investment in employee development and creative use of
technology. The ABS form has brought some unregulated activities under the
control of regulators and created the possibility of linking legal services to other
socially-conscious pro-consumer service providers. Risks emerging from these
early entrants into the ABS form include a concern about whether the public
aspects of lawyering, such as public oriented duties to improve the legal system
and offer pro bono services, become lost in a dominant corporate and client-
centered model. If so, a regulatory response may be required to correct this
imbalance.
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
II. OVERVIEW OF ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
III. FRAMING THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
UNITED STATES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 675
A. Common Theme: Changing Expectations, Globalization,
Competition, Growth of Law, Changing Products . . . . . . . . 675
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I am very grateful to the many U.K.
academics, lawyers and commentators who so generously shared their experience and insights
about the ABS process and changes in legal services, including Andy Boon, Nigel Duncan, John
Flood, AndrewHopper, RichardMoorhead, Avrom Sherr, LegalFutures (Neil Rose), and individu-
als at the Legal Services Board and Solicitors Regulation Authority. Many U.S. commentators have
sharpened my understanding of the topic: Cynthia Lichtenstein, Daniel Coquillette, John
Dzienkowski, Andrew Perlman, R. Michael Cassidy, and David Olson. My deep appreciation to the
Boston College Law School Fund for support of this research, participants in the ILEC 2014
London Conference and BC scholarship roundtable for their great insights, and Luke Liacos,
Sean Wall, Christopher Shin and Jamin Xu for their very able research assistance. © 2016, Judith
A. McMorrow.
665
B. Special Features of the U.K. Legal Services Market: Stratified
Bar, Reserve Activities, Changing Legal Services Funding
and Entity Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677
1. Stratified Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677
2. Reserve Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678
3. Changes in Referral Fees and Legal Aid
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
4. The ABS Regulatory Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680
IV. ABS MODELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
A. Small Firm— Transition Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
B. Riverview Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
1. Client Team Work & Flat Fee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
2. Human Capital. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
3. Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
4. Access to Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688
5. Lessons for the U.S. Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688
C. Co-Operative Legal Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
1. The Hope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691
2. The Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
D. LegalZoom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695
E. The Personal Injury Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
1. Minster Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
2. Winn Legal Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
F. Non-Profit Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703
V. EMERGING THEMES, ADVANTAGES AND CONCERNS . . . . . . . . . . . 705
A. Assessing Quality, Consumer Orientation and Client
Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
B. The Power of the Lawyer “Brand” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707
C. Improving Law, Legal Systems and Administration of
Justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708
I. INTRODUCTION
Should non-lawyers be able to own or invest in law firms?1 The
United Kingdom adopted a new Legal Services Act in 2007 that created
1. An alternate framing urged by Prof. Gillian Hatfield is whether a “muchmore diverse array
of permissible organizational and contractual forms to support innovation in the production,
pricing and delivery of legal services” should be allowed. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law:
Promoting Access to Justice through the (Un) Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 44
(2014) (describing lawyer opposition to corporate practice of law and urging “a much more
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a regulatory structure to encourage competition in the delivery of legal
services.2 One of the most interesting and provocative U.K. initiatives
was allowing alternative business structure (ABS) firms, which have
some form of non-lawyer involvement in the ownership and/ormanage-
ment of the firm.3 The fruits of that reform have begun to appear, with
over 400 ABS firms approved by the Solicitors Regulation Authority
between the first license on March 26, 2012, and July 31, 2015.4 The
ABS process aims to encourage creativity, with a commitment “to a level
playing field—there should be no favours or benefits for particular
business models.”5
This Article examines some early U.K. ABS firms and offers an
optimistic assessment of the benefits that are appearing.6 Some fascinat-
ing models have emerged that allow for easier experimentation in
delivery systems.7
diverse array of permissible organizational and contractual forms to support innovation in the
production, pricing and delivery of legal services”).
2. Legal Services Act of 2007, c. 29 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/
contents. This articled uses the word U.K. to capture the regulatory system in England and Wales.
3. Setting up and ABS, THE LAW SOC’Y http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/articles/setting-
up-an-abs/ (“An ABS is a regulated organization which provides legal services and has some form
of non-lawyer involvement. This involvement can either be at the management level e.g. as a
partner, director or member; or as an owner e.g. an investor or shareholder.”).
4. Several regulators have the ability to issue ABS licenses, but the SRA is the most active. See
ABS REGISTER, http://www.sra.org.uk/absregister/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).
5. Multi-disciplinary Practices Policy Statement, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/policy/policies/multi-disciplinary-practices.page [hereinafter MDP
Policy Statement].
6. The methodology is qualitative, beginning with approximately two months of preliminary
brainstorming in 2013 with regulators, academics and solicitors and non-lawyers thinking about or
forming ABS firms. There is a healthy amount of public information on ABS firms via the
Solicitors Regulation Authority, which is the main focus of this study. The Solicitors Regulation
Authority maintains a scholar’s dream source of data and information. Consistent with their goal
of transparency, they provide ongoing data of approved Alternative business structures (ABS) for
legal services. See Register of Licensed Bodies, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., https://sra.org.uk/
solicitors/firm-based-authorisation/abs/abs-search.page (last visited Jan. 25, 2016) [hereinafter
Register]. Through articles, essays and blogs, LegalFutures conferences, Stanford Center on the
Legal profession lectures, discerning commentators have offered on-the-ground insights into
forces that are shaping the various ABS firms. In most cases the ABS firms also have a significant
public profile on the web. After selecting a few cases studies I followed up with interviews of a
select number of ABS firms, advisors and regulators who were willing to speak with me. Interviews
were done after receiving Boston College Institutional Review Board approval (Mar. 7, 2014).
7. Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 60 (2015).
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● Some small firms transitioned to ABS status to provide key actors
an ownership interest in the firm, allowing the firm to acknowledge
contributions and retain those key actors.
● Riverview Law focuses on providing systematized legal services to
corporate clients through flat fee and team-based services.
● Cooperative Legal Services builds on a pre-existing cooperative
brand in food, banking and funeral services to provide affordable
legal services to middle-income clients.
● LegalZoom, the first U.S. legal services provider to expand into the
United Kingdom to create a law firm, anticipates that the ABS form
will allow it to provide more integrated legal services with their
online resources.
● Personal injury firms, which have widely varying models including
firms owned by insurance companies and private equity compa-
nies, have streamlined the small-claims market in the United
Kingdom.
● Specialty firms have created non-profit and for-profit partnerships,
with any profits used to support the non-profit unit.8
The ABS structure allows new entrants to avoid the legacy issues such
as billable hours; allows lawyers to be true partners with non-lawyers so
that they can avoid the negative aspects of lawyer-centric thinking that
pervades many traditional firms; provides access to capital to allow for
investment in personnel, infrastructure, marketing and creative use of
technology; in some cases brings the legal services provider under the
control of regulators to provide clients with additional protection; and
creates the possibility of linking legal services to other socially-
conscious pro-consumer service providers.
It is important to note that the ABS firms are subject to regulations
that require them to have systems in place to assure that the solicitor’s
professional obligations are met.9 The limited data monitoring com-
plaints has not shown an increase in disciplinary action against lawyers
in ABS firms, although the numbers are still small.10 This is an area that
should be subject to continued and close monitoring.
8. Neil Rose, Legal advice charity becomes first not-for-profit to set up an ABS, LEGAL FUTURES (Apr.
26, 2013), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/exclusive-legal-advice-charity-becomes-first-
not-for-profit-set-abs.
9. See Responsibilities of COPLs and COFAs, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., http://www.sra.org.
uk/solicitors/colp-cofa/responsibilities-record-report.page (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).
10. It can be hard to disentangle the interaction of ABS structure and entity regulation. Data
from Australia indicates that complaints against lawyers went down after the move to entity
regulation. Tahlia Ruth Gordon, Steve A. Mark & Christine Parker, Regulating Law Firm Ethics
Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of Incorporated Legal Practices, 37
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
668 [Vol. 47
One emerging issue is how public-oriented aspirational obligations,
such as a duty to improve the legal system and provide pro bono
services, will be developed or changed under an ABS model. Pro bono
is a fairly new concept in the United Kingdom, which until recently had
more robust public funding for civil legal services for the poor.11 The
corporate models described below raise a question whether aspira-
tional public benefits, such as pro bono, collapse into a larger concept
of corporate social responsibility and the consequences of that change.
This is an area that needs to be monitored as new models emerge.12
II. OVERVIEW OF ISSUES
Allowing ABS firms reflects two important changes in attorney
regulation in the United Kingdom. First, ABS structure is made pos-
sible by entity regulation, which supplements the traditional focus
regulating the individual solicitor, barrister, or other legal professional.
The firm itself, not just individual lawyers, is also licensed and regu-
lated. As part of entity regulation, every U.K. firm (including ABS
firms) must have a Compliance Officer for Legal Practice (COLP), who
is responsible for assuring compliance with the professional obligations
of the firm, and a Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration
(COFA), who is responsible for assuring that sound financial and
management practices are being maintained.13 Second, the regulatory
changes create a structure to reorient legal services from a lawyer-
centered focus to a client and customer-oriented perspective.14
The U.S. bar has staunchly resisted non-lawyer ownership and invest-
ment, while Australia, the United Kingdom, and several European
countries have dropped the prohibition.15 Canada is on the road to
J.L. & SOC’Y 466 (2010). For discussion of data from the UK, see Robinson, infra note 12, at Part
III(C) (discussion of Standards of Professional Practice).
11. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Part 2, c. 10 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/10/contents/enacted (reducing legal aid funding).
12. I find more benefits than are emphasized by Nick Robinson in his excellent article, and
ammore optimistic that client risks can be managed through regulation. SeeNick Robinson,When
Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership of Legal Services, Access, and Professionalism, GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming).
13. SRA HANDBOOK r. 8.5 (2015); see Robinson, supra note 12, at Part I.
14. This move toward service is occurring in the U.S. legal market as well. See Marni
Becker-Avin, Client Service: The New Normal in the Legal Industry, LAW PRACTICE TODAY (May 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_practice_today_home/lpt-
archives/may13/client-service-the-new-normal-in-the-legal-industry.html.
15. “(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law . . . (d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a
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allowing ABS firms.16 The Australian experience has garnered some
attention in the United States but both the comparatively small size of
their profession and its geographic distance may have caused their
experience to be less influential in the United States. The United
Kingdom’s more recent liberalization has a much higher chance of
influencing the U.S. legal profession given the United States’ closer
physical, economic, and historic ties. Both the United States and the
United Kingdom embrace similar aims of regulating the legal profes-
sion to promote the dual goal of protecting consumers/clients and
supporting the rule of law, which includes assuring that professional
principles are met.17 Yet in the question of insularity of the legal
profession—kept separate and distinct from non-lawyers—our systems
take starkly different approaches.18
Scholars have been much more receptive and supportive of non-
lawyer owners and investors than the U.S. practicing bar.19 Bar resis-
professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: (1) a non-lawyer
owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold
the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration; (2) a non-lawyer is
a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar responsibility in any
form of association other than a corporation; or (3) a non-lawyer has the right to direct or control
the professional judgment of a lawyer.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5.4(b), (d) (2013); see
Perlman, supra note 7, at 70-87 (summarizing bar resistance); see FRANK H. STEPHEN, LAWYERS,
MARKETS AND REGULATION 77-79 (2013) (providing more information on European countries: in
2011 Italy authorized alternative business structures for legal services; Finland has a system of
liberal definition of practice of law, with more significant restrictions for advocates who can
appear in criminal courts).
16. See THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FUTURES: TRANSFORMING THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL
SERVICES IN CANADA (Aug. 2014).
17. See Charles Plant, Risk and Compliance: Challenge of Change, LAW SOC. GAZETTE (Apr. 28,
2014), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/risk-and-compliance-challenge-of-change/5040989.
article.
18. See Laura Snyder, Does the UK Know Something We Don’t About Alternative Business Structures?,
ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/does_the_uk_know_
something_we_dont_about_alternative_business_structures; Laurel S. Terry, Transnational Legal
Practice (International), 47 INT’L LAW. 485, 485-87 (2013). Of course, the U.S. and U.K. are not the
only examples of these different approaches. A growing body of excellent work on comparative
legal professions reflects an array of approaches to regulation, reserve activities, and the like. See,
e.g., STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 73-83 (exploring liberalization of legal markets in other European
jurisdictions).
19. See, e.g., Anthony Sebok, What We Talk About When We Talk About Control, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2939 (2014) (“the doctrines constraining both litigation investment and fee splitting with
non-lawyers sweep too broadly when they prevent lay persons from buying an interest in litigation,
and that the threat of interference with lawyers’ professional independence is, in both cases,
overblown.”); Hadfield, supra note 1.
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tance takes two forms. The first concern is competition, although overt
reference to not wanting competition is quickly curbed in discussions
because of antitrust concerns.20 The second publicly discussed issue is
concern for the erosion of the professional independence of lawyers.21
The latter issue is often discussed with prophetic rhetoric that empha-
sizes the core values of lawyer independence, and expresses deep and
understandable concern for the professionalism of lawyers.22 Aside
from the specific obligations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
legal profession does not have a concrete and universally accepted
definition of independence, professionalism, professional identity, or
legal judgment.23 But whatever words are used, there is a core concern
that non-lawyer ownership and investment in law firms will expose
lawyers to the unfettered pressures of the market place.24
Discussions of non-lawyer ownership and investment often include
an abstract and idealized version of professional independence that is
20. See Goldfarb v. Virginia St. Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788, 793 (1975) (finding that lawyers are
not exempt from antitrust laws); N. Carolina St. Board of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 135 S.Ct.
1101, 1114 (2015) (holding that federal antitrust law applies to State Board of Dental Examiners
efforts to extend practice of dentistry to teeth whitening services where state delegated its
regulatory power to active market participants; federal antitrust law prohibits anticompetitive
self-regulation).
21. See Robinson, supra note 12, at III(B). For an excellent discussion of lawyer independence
see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued, 46 AKRON L. REV.
599 (2013). One effort to support independence is the long-stated concept of self regulation. The
erosion of self-regulation is well-documented, so that the legal profession is now more properly
understood as regulated by multiple sources, both internally and externally. Fred C. Zacharias,
The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
22. W. Bradley Wendel, In Search of Core Values, 16 LEGAL ETHICS 350 (2013); Lawrence J. Fox,
Accountants, The Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other
Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000); Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New
Management: The Problem of Non-lawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593
(1994); see Cathleen Kaveny, Prophecy and Casuistry: Abortion, Torture and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L.
REV. 499 (2006) (analyzing the prophetic rhetoric in law); Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets:
Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1995).
23. Some academics have done heroic work to explore this topic. Prof. Neil Hamilton has
written extensively on the topic. See, e.g.,Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress
in the Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 470 (2008); see also Neil
Hamilton, Ethical Leadership in Professional Life, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 358 (2009); Prof. Thomas
Morgan has pushed the academy to question whether the idea of professionalism adds anything to
the analysis of the underlying concerns. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER
(2010). See also Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9, 32 (1988).
24. For a fascinating exploration of the law versus business debate, see Symposium, The Law:
Business or Profession? The Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2012).
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compared against the possibility of erosion of the ideal.25 Reports from
practice, however, indicate that lawyers in the current system face unrelent-
ing pressures to erode their professional practice.26 The tension be-
tween profits and ethics is endemic in law, as it is in all other business
ventures.27 One important question is whether ABS structure will
enhance the pressure, and whether regulation can be effective in
blunting it.
Further complicating the discussion is the reality that some lawyers
have very poor business acumen, such as lack of organizational skills,
poor systems of communication with clients, and excessive caseloads,
which makes them vulnerable to ethical violations. In other words, in
some instances it was the dearth of good business insights that led to
the professional failures.28
25. Cf. Sebok, supra note 19; Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12
J. L. & ECON. 1, 12 (1969); Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation
Financing, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 593 (2012).
26. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 203-13 (2015) (analyzing complaints against lawyers, concluding that there is “good
reason to doubt the sincerity of bar associations warning about the potential harms to clients by
non-lawyers”); Wendell, supra note 22, at 361-63. The organized bar recognizes that there are
serious problems in current delivery models. In 2014, ABA president William C. Hubbard
appointed the ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, which among its missions seeks
to “foster the development of financially viable models for delivering legal services that meet the
public’s needs” and look at “new models for regulating legal services.” See William C. Hubbard,
ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Report to the House of Delegates, AM. BAR ASSOC.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/centers_commissions/commission-on-the-future-of-legal-
services.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2016) (“The American Bar Association (ABA) is well-positioned
to lead the effort to improve the delivery of, and access to, legal services in the United States. The
ABA can inspire innovation, leverage technology, encourage new models for regulating legal
services and educating tomorrow’s legal professionals, and foster the development of financially
viable models for delivering legal services that meet the public’s needs.”).
27. The Chair’s introduction to the Ethics 2000 project, which reevaluated the rules of
professional conduct, noted the “persistent concerns about lawyer honesty, candor and civility,”
“competitive pressures,” and “internal pressures on law firm organization and management” as
drivers of the reevaluation of the rules. Hon E. Norman Veasey, Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 20000”), Chair’s Introduction (2002), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/e2k_chair_intro.
authcheckdam.pdf. See also TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS,
ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (2014); Anne Barraquier, Ethical Behaviour in
Practice: Decision Outcomes and Strategic Implications, 22 BRITISH J. MGMT S28, S29 (2011) (noting the
conflict between ethics and profit experienced by managers, particularly in uncertain and
unstable environments).
28. See, e.g., Judith A. McMorrow, In Defense of the Business of Law, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 459
(2012); Tahlia Gordon & SteveMarks, Access to Justice: Can You Invest in It?, CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES
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Bar resistance to non-lawyer owners and investors inevitably focuses
on a lawyer-centric model of service delivery. This focus offers a very
important benefit because it allows the conversation to address the
ethical and fiduciary obligations of the lawyer. But a lawyer-centered
focus can blind the legal profession. Maintaining lawyer control over all
private sector delivery models (i.e., law firms) rests on claims of lawyer
exceptionalism. In essence, the argument is that professional obliga-
tions of lawyers offer the only place to introduce professional skills and
values to the legal system.29 While there are areas in the current market
in which lawyers and non-lawyers offer services to the same sector (tax,
accounting, patent, immigration, labor arbitration, etc.), this Article
embraces the recognition that there is important value-added to a
lawyer’s contribution to an enterprise. This does not lead inexorably to
a conclusion that only lawyers can do certain tasks. Many commenta-
tors have debunked this idea thoroughly.30 The sheer growth of law
and its ubiquitous placement in society increasingly calls into question
the lawyer’s claim of superiority in all aspects of legal analysis and service
delivery.31 Prof. Stephen Mayson offers a strident, almost painful,
critique:
There is an insidious consequence of believing that lawyers are
the best, or only, resource for all tasks: it is that it downplays and
demeans the ‘non-lawyer’ input, whether that is another per-
son, technology, a process or management. It is not surprising
that there is an ‘us and them’ divide between lawyers and
others, that inefficiencies persist, or that potential remains
unrealized, when such an unhelpful and insulting attitude is
prevalent.32
P/L (June 2014), http://legal.opaxweb.biz/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Access-to-Justice-ABS-
GordonMark-Final.pdf.
29. The phrase “legal system” can be ambiguous. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptional-
ism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 74 (2010); Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other
Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. (2014); Bridgette Dunlap, Anyone Can
“Think Like a Lawyer”: How the Lawyers’ Monopoly on Legal Understanding Undermines Democracy and the
Rule of Law in the United States, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2817 (2014); MORGAN, supra note 23.
30. Levin, supra note 29; see Perlman, supra note 7.
31. For a discussion of the legalization process, see Marc Galanter, More Lawyers than People:
The Global Multiplication of Legal Professionals, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 68-89 (Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011).
32. STEPHENMAYSON, RESTORING A FUTURE FOR LAW 5 (Oct. 2013), http://stephenmayson.files.
wordpress.com/2013/10/mayson-2013-restoring-a-future-for-law.pdf.
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Even the framing of “lawyer” as compared to “non-lawyer” puts lawyers
as the essence and pushes the rest of the world to the periphery.
Imagine an alternative framing in which professionals come together
to resolve problems, with professional lawyers, information specialists,
and client managers all focusing on the shared goal. 33 A blanket ban
on non-lawyer partners and investors denigrates the possibility of
significant, equity-justifying contributions by non-lawyers, either through
business or IT expertise, or as a non-lawyer specialist. Lawyers too often
act like lawyers own the law.
The claim of lawyer exceptionalism is ultimately overbroad and
collapses all aspects of legal services, from small repetitive claims to
complex mergers and acquisitions, into one lump. It also ignores the
reality that in-house corporate counsel function as a captive non-lawyer
owner and investor in a “firm” that has a single corporate client.
Another major problem with a lawyer-centric model is that it carries a
presumption of amoral or immoral behavior by non-lawyers, a proposi-
tion that needs justification.34 There is also some irony that the
organized bar in the United States has maintained this one rule of
entity regulation (no non-lawyer owners or investors) but largely re-
sisted other forms of entity regulation that might improve professional
independence.35
There are legitimate concerns about risks of ABS firms. There is an
obvious concern that non-lawyer owners and investors may put their
profit maximization goals ahead of professional obligations to clients
more often than lawyers might succumb to the same temptation,
presumably because lawyers would hopefully have internalized values
33. See Stanford Center for Legal Information, Regulator’s Response to the Economic and Tech
Forces Transforming the Legal Profession, 22:00-24:00, YOUTUBE (May 6, 2015) https://www.youtube.
com/watch?vMct9pE0Ap64. (comments of Karl Chapman, founder of Riverview Law); see also
Perlman, supra note 7.
34. There is some indication that the moral development of lawyers may be stunted by the
legal mentality. See SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 41 (2004) (discussing lawyer moral development and
moral behavior; “There is evidence that lawyers’ stages of moral development and decision-
making styles are consistently and disproportionately focused on maintaining rules, regulations,
social order, and conformity; however, there is also evidence that their stage of moral develop-
ment does not differ from the moral development of other similarly educated adults.”).
35. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority in Large Law Firms, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63 (2009).
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of ethical conduct through their legal training and practice.36 A
blanket ban reflects skepticism that firm regulation can temper that
risk. Even if regulation can temper the risk, it is important to make
clear to non-lawyer owners and investors that there is a financial risk
that comes from investing in any regulated industry. But regulatory risk
is a well-understood concept for those who venture into these waters.
U.S. bar opposition remains in part due to an empirical standoff.37 In
policy discussions and informal conversations, proponents of change
point to the benefits of non-lawyer ownership and investment and ask
for proof that newmodels will erode professional judgment; opponents
question whether there are meaningful benefits and demand proof
that the changes will not impair professional judgment.38 The Austra-
lian and U.K. experiences help fill this information void.39
Part III provides additional background information for those new to
this topic. Readers familiar with the ABS debate and distinctions
between the U.S. and U.K. legal systems may find it useful to go directly
to Part III.
III. FRAMING THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
UNITED STATES
A. Common Theme: Changing Expectations, Globalization, Competition,
Growth of Law, Changing Products
The same forces that are pushing for change in the U.S. legal services
market are having an impact in the United Kingdom as well. These
forces have been well-described by others. The repeat actor corporate
clients “are more demanding buyers of legal services—this can be
ascribed to a number of factors, including the consolidation of legal
panels, a greater scrutiny on fees and the desire for global solutions
36. See RICHARD MOORHOUSE ET AL., DESIGNING ETHICS INDICATORS FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROVI-
SION (2012), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/law-ethics/research/papers/Designing-Ethics-Indicators-
for-Legal-Services-Provision.
37. See Perlman, supra note 7, at 79 (“The [Ethics 20/20] Commission ultimately cited this
paucity of evidence as one of the primary reasons it decided to drop further efforts to amend
Model Rule 5.4”).
38. My thanks to Andrew Perlman, Chief Reporter for the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20,
for his insights on these topics.
39. One of the first systematic critiques is by Nick Robinson, who argues that the benefit of
non-lawyer ownership has been “oversold with respect to access to civil legal services for poor and
moderate-income populations,” pointing to current trends in the early ABS models, and to some
examples of ABS firms that raise heightened conflict concerns. Robinson, supra note 12, at 38.
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(and corresponding global discounts).”40 Increased competition pro-
vides these knowledgeable clients with stronger leverage. There is also
a growing market for legal information analysis, which is a different
type of service than traditionally offered by large firms.41 Technology
has also reshaped legal services in some sectors, creating opportunities
to rethink entire delivery systems. In the United Kingdom in particular,
technology has also “broadened the range of businesses in which
solicitors work.”42
In addition to these changing expectations, globalization, competi-
tion, and the transformative effect of technology is the growth of law
and the increase of “space” in which national law no longer provides a
quasi-dispositive answer. We live in a thick law environment in devel-
oped countries and a world in which transnational practice is filling
voids in international law.43 This ubiquitous nature of law is one factor
that appears to drive the increasing focus on interdisciplinary work
among legal academics.44
These trends have also more sharply delineated the many different
markets for legal services. The Legal Services Board, the uber-regulator
of the United Kingdom, developed a framework for analyzing legal
services, and found deep market segmentation based on the type of
consumer (which varied widely even within a particular area of law),
type of consumer problem, and the type of legal activity.45 Commenta-
tors have noted that non-lawyer ownership may be more appropriate
for areas of law that allow for economies of scale, standardization and
management of related costs.46
40. Sir Nigel Knowles, Legal M&A as an ‘Imminent Certainty,’ EVENING STANDARD (Feb. 3,
2014), http://www.standard.co.uk/business/markets/sir-nigel-knowles-legal-mas-an-imminent-
certainty-9103944.html (predict extensive consolidation).
41. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749, 777-97 (2010).
42. Plant, supra note 17, at 2.
43. Symposium, Filling Power Vacuums in the New Global Legal Order, 54 B.C. L. REV. 3 (2013).
44. See, e.g., Stepan Wood, Anne-Marie Slaughter, & Andrew S. Tulumello, International Law
and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
367 (1998); Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2006).
45. Stephen Mayson, Restoring a Future for Law, LEGAL SERVS. BD. (June 1, 2015), https://
research.legalservicesboard.org.uk/analysis/supply/static-market-analysis/market-segmentation.
46. Robinson, supra note 12, at 38.
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B. Special Features of the U.K. Legal Services Market: Stratified Bar, Reserve
Activities, Changing Legal Services Funding and Entity Regulation
Despite our strong commonalities, there are four important differ-
ences between the U.S. and U.K. legal markets that are immediately
relevant. First, the United Kingdom has traditionally had a stratified
bar, with distinctions between barristers, solicitors and other service
providers. Second, the United Kingdom has a narrower definition of
what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, called “reserve
activities.”47 Third, the United Kingdom is undergoing major changes
in funding of legal aid that is pulling back on publicly funded legal
services, causing significant disruptions. Finally, as noted above, the
United Kingdom has moved to entity regulation as a parallel system of
regulation alongside regulating the individual legal professional. This
entity regulation focuses on ongoing assessments of risks created by the
legal practice and business structure. This pushes all firms, including
ABS firms, to think about structural and business choices and how they
affect core legal services and ethical obligations.
1. Stratified Bar
In the United Kingdom the legal profession has been divided into
solicitors, who typically handle activities outside of court, and barris-
ters, who litigate.48 The United Kingdom also has other specialized and
regulated legal actors, including Licensed Conveyancers, Chartered
Accountants, and Intellectual Property practitioners.49 Deregulation,
however, now allows solicitors and barristers to practice together
(along with other professionals), which is eroding the distinctions.50
47. See Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1, 835 (1986)(provides a
history of unauthorized practice of law in the US; notes that “[o]n the whole, state law has been
characterized by its broad sweep and imprecise definition). Cf. Reserved Legal Activities (summa-
rized), LEGAL SERVS. BD., http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/can_we_help/faqs/Reserved_
Legal_Activities.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2016); Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s
Monopoly on the Practice of Law In a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903, 2907 n.10, 2913-14
(2014) (comparing U.K. with other EU countries, U.K. legal advice is exercised by solicitors and
barristers but is not a reserve activity).
48. See STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 68.
49. The Legal Services Regulatory Board oversees eleven approved regulators. LEGAL SERVS.
BD., DRAFT: STRATEGIC PLAN 2015-18 AND BUSINESS PLAN 2015/16 (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.
legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/Open/pdf/2014/20141209_Draft_
Strategic_And_Business_Plans.pdf.
50. See John Flood & Avis Whyte, Straight There No Detours: Direct Access to Barristers (U. of
Westminster School of Law Research Paper No. 09-05, Nov. 1, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1321492.
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Globalization of legal services is also accelerating the erosion of the
barrister/solicitor distinction. Global law firms are more likely to talk
about “lawyers,” which is the language of the global legal services
market, than solicitors and barristers, even as the individual licensed
professionals maintain that status.51 The erosion of the regulatory
distinctions and the ability of solicitors and barristers to practice
together will likely accelerate the move toward the international label
of “lawyer,” with all the ambiguities that word may include.
2. Reserve Activities
In the United States, the individual states have unauthorized practice
of law (UPL) statutes that give lawyers monopoly power over a broad
range of litigation and non-litigation activities.52 That being said, once
one digs into the weeds of UPL, the state doctrines are surprisingly
fuzzy in application.53 Lawyers can delegate almost all activities, except
court appearances, to non-lawyers under the lawyer’s supervision, an
important caveat.54 Large categories of work, including the growing
fields of compliance and business advising, are areas in which lawyers
and non-lawyers compete for work.55 Federal law allows lawyers and
non-lawyers to function side-by-side in a variety of contexts, including
social security, patent, tax and immigration.56 Even with these complexi-
ties, legal practice in the United States functions under the shadow of
the UPL doctrine, which is broader in the United States than in most
51. Interview with Andrew Hopper, QC (July 10, 2014); Interview with Chris Kenny, Chief
Executive of Legal Services Board (July 11, 2014). The websites of multinational firms with a
strong presence in the UK reinforce that they present their professionals as service providers and
use the word “lawyers.” See, e.g., London, SHERMAN& STERLING LLP, http://www.shearman.com/en/
offices/london (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); London, MAYER BROWN, http://www.mayerbrown.com/
locations/London/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); London, KING & SPALDING, http://www.kslaw.com/
offices/london (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); United States, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER,
http://www.freshfields.com (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
52. See Alexis Anderson, Custom and Practice Unmasked: The Legal History of Massachusetts’
Experience with the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 94 MASS. L. REV. 124 (2013).
53. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shadow Lawyering: Non-lawyer Practice within Law Firms, 85 IND. L.
REV. 653 (2010); Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (2002); Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers
to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1315 (2000).
54. Tremblay, supra note 53, at 653.
55. Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of Lawyers’ Monopoly
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2014).
56. Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’ Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal
Ethics Through Legislative, Court and Agency Regulation, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011).
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other countries. As a result, some innovations, such as LegalZoom,
must carefully manage around state UPL statutes.57
In sharp contrast to the United States, in the United Kingdom “there
is no restriction on supplying legal advice for gain,” although there are
restrictions on the training and membership required to use the titles
“solicitor” and “barrister.”58 In other words, much non-litigation legal
activity in the United Kingdom is not reserved solely to lawyers, with the
exception of a few specified areas. As a result, a good deal of what is
called the practice of law in the United States could be performed by
those without a solicitor’s license in the United Kingdom. Yet there is
indeed a strong business market for solicitors offering business services
comparable to the United States.
Surprisingly, there are firms that could potentially provide services
without being licensed as an ABS, but instead choose to submit
themselves to regulation.59 This suggests that the lawyer/solicitor
“brand” has value both in terms of quality and some protection to
clients/consumers through regulation. In particular, unlike the United
States, solicitors in the United Kingdom have mandatory malpractice,
which offers significant protection to clients if things go awry.60
3. Changes in Referral Fees and Legal Aid Funding
A third factor accelerating change in the U.K. legal services market is
the recent ban on referral fees and the significant retrenchment in
state-funding of legal services.61 These changes are pushing the United
Kingdom closer to the U.S. model of vast unmet legal needs with
inadequate funding to provide traditional legal services. One promise
57. Catherine J. Lanctot, Does LegalZoom Have First Amendment Rights?: Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 257-61
(2011).
58. STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 26. For more background on legal monopolies, see Laurel S.
Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2903 (2014).
59. See, e.g., Nick Hilborne, Latest ABSs: Mishcon de Reya, Lake District Firm and Probate Advisors
Take the Plunge, LEGAL FUTURES (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:05 AM), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-
news/latest-abss-mishcon-de-reya-lake-district-firm-probate-advisers-take-plunge/print.
60. Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 177, 189 (2012); Levin, supra note 29, at 2631.
61. The cuts have had a significant impact on client access to legal services. Nick Hilborne,
Mr. Justice Mostyn: Nobody Anticipated “Savagery” of Legal Aid Cuts, LEGAL FUTURES (July 1, 2015, 12:03
AM), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/mr-justice-mostyn-nobody-anticipated-savagery-
of-legal-aid-cuts. It has also impacted the business of lawyers who had served the legal services
market that previously had more generous public funding.
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of ABS firms was the possibility of offering more affordable legal
services to middle and low-income clients, particularly in areas that
could be more easily commoditized.62 Early data suggests that ABS
firms are not at the moment helping to fill the void.63 That being said,
there are some ABS models discussed below that hold some promise to
make legal services more readily available and affordable, if allowed to
percolate and experiment.
4. The ABS Regulatory Process
The ABS regulatory process is shaping the ABS firms. With the 2007
Act, the Legal Services Board (LSB) became the super-regulator of all
legal services in the United Kingdom. The LSB publicly declares on its
website that its goal is to “reform and modernise the legal services
market place by putting the interests of consumers at the heart of the
system.”64 That being said, the 2007 Act sets out multiple regulatory
objectives:
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest;
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law;
(c) improving access to justice;
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers;
(e) promoting competition in the provision of services;
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse, and effective
legal profession;
(g) increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights
and duties;
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional
principles.65
Although only two of the eight objectives relate to protecting and
promoting the interests of consumers and encouraging competition in
legal services, it is clear that the remaining goals are framed through
those objectives. Note that the regulatory objects quoted above use the
terms “consumers” and “citizens” rather than the word “client.”66 The
first LSB director, Chris Kenny, was not a lawyer, moving the center of
gravity away from a lawyer-dominated system. Until the end of 2013 the
62. Robinson, supra note 12, at Part I(A).
63. Id. at 11.
64. LEGAL SERVS. BD., http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
65. Legal Services Act of 2007, supra note 2, at 1-2.
66. Id.
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LSB offices were in Grosvenor House, which is also the home of the
Competition Commission.
The LSB has had an aggressive, and sometimes antagonistic, relation-
ship with the regulatory agencies, such as the Solicitors Regulation
Authority (SRA) and the Bar Standards Board (BSB), which regulates
barristers. For example, in March 2015 the LSB issued a Discussion
Paper challenging “unnecessary restrictions on in-house lawyers.”67
“Where a regulator places restrictions on in-house practice over and
above the minimum required by the Act, we expect it to be able to
demonstrate this is necessary with compelling evidence in terms of risk
to the regulatory objectives.”68
Currently the SRA, the Council for Licensed Conveyancers (CLC),
and the BSB are reauthorized by the Legal Services Board to issue ABS
licenses.69 This Article focuses on the SRA, which has been the most
active regulator, and which regulates solicitors.
By October 2015, over 430 ASB firms were approved by the SRA.70 In
a 2014 study, the SRA found that for multi-disciplinary practices, “a
business that delivers reserved legal services with other professional
services, such as accountancy, land and housing management, corpo-
rate services or financial services” applications have been “small.”71
They attribute part of the sluggish use of Multi-disciplinary Practices
Policy Statement (MDP) ABS to a complex application process that can
include duplicate and conflicting regulation.72 Some accounting firms,
including KPMG and PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), have been li-
censed as ABS firms.73 Since these firms have tended to compete in the
legal/business advisory space for many years, it is not yet clear what
difference ABS structure will make in the actual functioning of the
firms.
67. LEGAL SERVS. BD., ARE REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS IN PRACTISING RULES FOR IN-HOUSE
LAWYERS JUSTIFIED? 1, 4 (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/Projects/thematic_
review/pdf/S15_(In_House_Lawyers)_Discussion_Paper_(Feb_2015).pdf.
68. Id.
69. See STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 120.
70. See Register, supra note 6.
71. MDP Policy Statement, supra note 5 (“the number of applications from MDPs has been
small (in the tens rather than the hundreds) and feedback from potential applicants and others
has indicated that part of the problem relates to the SRA rules.”).
72. Id.
73. ABS License, Solicitor’s Regulation Auth., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL LLP (Jan. 30,
2014), http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/firm-based-authorisation/abs-register/442833.page; ABS
License, Solicitor’s Regulation Auth., KPMG LLP (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/
firm-based-authorisation/abs-register/615423.page.
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In theory this self-examination of the regulatory process should be
the natural outcome of regulatory competition, in which firms may
elect to be regulated by other authorized bodies or—if allowed—
choose not to be regulated at all, which means foregoing the ability to
use the titles “solicitor,” “barrister,” and “conveyancer.”74 It appears
from the public statements, however, that the rethinking of the regula-
tory scheme is driven by LSB pressure to improve competition and
reduce self-interested regulation. This raises an understandable con-
cern that the interest in competition may trump the interest in con-
sumer protection. This risk of a race to the bottom is one fundamental
objection to opening up the U.S. market to non-lawyer ownership and
control.
IV. ABS MODELS
Set out below are several models of alternative business structure
firms. These examples offer an opportunity to explore in greater detail
the advantages, inner-workings and some of the difficulties that come
with ABS structure.
A. Small Firm—Transition Planning
John Welch & Stammers Solicitors (JWS) in Oxfordshire town of
Whitney, United Kingdom was the first ABS firm authorized.75 This
seventy-five year old firm has five solicitors (three partners), one
licensed conveyancer, one legal executive, and another recently added
trainee. The firm states on its website that “[t]he main purpose of JWS
becoming an ABS was so that our non-lawyer Practice Manager Berna-
dette Summers could be a partner. Although the introduction of ABS’s
allows more diversity in law firms, JWS has not changed at all and will
always retain its ethos as far as it’s [sic] loyal client base is concerned.” 76
John Welch & Stammers’ choice to embrace ABS status is representa-
tive of a fairly common cohort of firms. A Legal Services Board Survey
of early adopters of ABS status indicated that the significant majority of
ABS firms were not changing their target clients.77
74. STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 111-26.
75. ABS License, Solicitor’s Regulation Auth., JOHN WELCH & STAMMERS SOLICITORS (Mar. 26,
2012), http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/firm-based-authorisation/abs-register/567390.page.
76. History, JOHNWELCH & STAMMERS SOLICITORS, http://www.johnwelchandstammers.co.uk/
history.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
77. 2013 ABS Survey Data, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD (July-Aug. 2013), https://research.
legalservicesboard.org.uk/news/data-sources/ (follow “2013 ABS survey data” hyperlink). LEGAL
SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, CONSUMER IMPACT REPORT 2014 14 (2014), http://www.
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Why convert to an ABS if it does not result in change in services? The
first wave of ABS firms included many other examples of small firms
converting to ABS status to bring in a non-lawyer as a partner, it appears
for succession planning and respect purposes. For example, the solici-
tor’s spouse may have had a long-standing role in the firm, and
allowing that spouse to become a partner may offer certain tax advan-
tages (receiving income as corporate profits rather than salary may
lower the partner’s taxes.)78 In terms of business theory, ownership
gives enhanced incentives to promote the interests of the firm.79 The
symbolic value of being an equally valued member of the team should
not be discounted. A key person is named, honored, and rewarded,
which encourages that person to stay with the firm. Too many law firms
fail because they do not have sufficient business acumen. Valuing that
acumen promotes the goal of providing quality legal services.80
Remember that the Compliance Officer for Legal Practice is re-
quired to assure that there is compliance with the legal and ethical
obligations of the firm. In addition, the solicitors, conveyancers, and
legal executives all are subject to individual regulation and codes of
conduct relevant to their field.81 If there is an ethical failure, the
firm—as well as the individual professionals—risks losing its license or
being sanctioned.
But the small firm adopters are not sufficient to achieve change in
the provision of legal services. Observers are more interested in the
ABS firms that introduce new delivery models. Set out below are
additional examples of ABS firms that represent business models that
would be more difficult—but not impossible—to implement in the
United States, which prohibits the ABS entity structure. These were
chosen because they provide vivid examples of honing delivery systems
for better-quality volume services, building on an existing consumer-
legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/research_and_reports/documents/Consumer%
20Impact%20Report%203.pdf.
78. See DELOITTE, TAXATION AND INVESTMENT IN UNITED KINGDOM 2015: REACH, RELEVANCE AND
RELIABILITY 26 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/
Tax/dttl-tax-unitedkingdomguide-2015.pdf (income tax rates are higher in the U.K. than capital
gains tax rates).
79. Hadfield, supra note 1, at 54.
80. McMorrow, supra note 28.
81. See SOLICITOR’S REGULATORY AUTH., SRA CODE OF CONDUCT 2011 (2015), http://www.sra.
org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page; COUNCIL FOR LICENSED CONVEYANCERS, HAND-
BOOK, http://www.conveyancer.org.uk/Handbook/Handbook.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2015);
CHARTERED INST. OF LEGAL EXECS., CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.cilex.org.uk/membership/code_
of_conduct.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
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oriented brand, pooling of expertise, and nonprofit and for-profit
partnerships. All seek operational efficiency, an essential attribute of all
industries in today’s world.82
B. Riverview Law
Riverview Law has attracted a great deal of attention, with indication
that it is emerging as a success story.83 Riverview offers a conceptual
shift from an income-driven model to a capital appreciation model.
Riverview focuses on “legal advisory outsourcing,” which “is focused on
the 60-70% of legal work that large organizations do every day of the
week, every week of the month, every month of the year that can be
packaged into long-term contracts.”84 It focuses on the more routin-
ized work, including litigation, leaving in-house counsel to handle the
policy and other high-end work, although Riverview input may affect
that policy development. Riverview enters into long-term contracts with
corporations with the goal of providing tailored legal services.
The law firm arose from the perspective of a customer-oriented
service industry that happens to offer legal services. It is no accident
that the prime mover, Karl Chapman, has a strong track record in
forming and nurturing new businesses. Prior to Riverview Law he had
formed AdviserPlus Business Solutions, which is an advisory outsourc-
ing business that provides human resources and health and safety
advice and services to a range of businesses.85 This gave Chapman
insights into the infrastructure needs of businesses. It was AdviserPlus
client requests wishing for legal services to be offered in a similar model
that was one impetus for Riverview.86 Initially Riverview anticipated that
the main users of its services would be small and midsized businesses
82. Alison Bond, Beware the Stealth ABS Revolution, LAWYER (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.
thelawyer.com/beware-the-stealth-abs-revolution/1016436.article (“Corporates have spent the
past five years improving their operational efficiency. Many would say the legal sector, in serving
these clients, needs to catch up.”).
83. Heidi K. Gardner & Silvia Hodges Silverstein, Riverview Law: Applying Business Sense to the
Legal Market, HARV. BUS. REV., June 4, 2014. It can be difficult to penetrate the internal story, so this
description is based on what Riverview and others chose to share. I do have the benefit of public
documents, such as filings on turnover, which helps confirm some factual claims.
84. This description appears on the Riverview Law webpage. RIVERVIEW LAW, http://www.
riverviewlaw.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
85. Karl Chapman: Chief Executive Officer, RIVERVIEW LAW, http://www.riverviewlaw.com/team/
karl-chapman/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
86. Stanford Center on the Legal Profession, Keep Calm and Carry On?: Disruption in the UK
Legal Market and What it Could Mean for the US, YOUTUBE (May 5, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?veJHbahKw_ws&listPL8D43B7B88B368B7B [hereinafter Stanford Panel].
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but quickly found that larger companies were very interested in this
business model.87
At first blush it may look like Riverview Law offers the same tradi-
tional legal services in the same way, except through flat fee rates.
Beneath the surface, however, are both cultural and structural changes
from the typical income-driven model of a U.S. law firm. It appears that
the business model is built on three key features: (1) team approach to
service delivery that allows for flat fee billing and long-term contracts;
(2) heavy investment in human capital; and (3) a robust IT system to
support the model and provide business value-added to their clients.
All three of these aspects of their business model are possible because
they have access to capital to build this service.
1. Client Team Work & Flat Fee
Riverview Law uses fixed fees, coupled with long-term contracts, as a
central feature of its business model. Fixed fees are emerging in
traditional law firms as well.88 But the long-term contracts, with a goal
of contract renewal, create a very strong alignment of interests between
the law firm and clients. This fixed-price model encourages Riverview
to invest in efficiency in delivering its own legal services. It creates a
structural incentive to reduce the legal problems confronting the
client, which advances the business interests of the clients. This model
relies heavily on both developing a very competent and effective team
at Riverview to serve the needs of the client and an IT infrastructure
that will allow Riverview to provide business as well as legal insights.
Under this model, the best indication of providing quality services is
renewal of the contracts.89
2. Human Capital
To actively serve a client’s needs, Riverview Law states that it pro-
motes a culture of team service to clients. Most traditional firms claim
to offer teamwork and efficiency, but here the structural incentives in
the business model promote the goals of teamwork and client satisfac-
87. Id.
88. Ronald D. Rotunda,Moving from Billable Hours to Fixed Fees: Task-Based Fees and Legal Ethics,
47 KAN. L. REV. 819 (1999).
89. See Stanford Panel, supra note 86. There is also a provocative and humorous video on
YouTube emphasizing the client desire for fixed fees and the traditional law firm’s resistance to
this idea. SeeRiverview Law, Cometh the Hour, YOUTUBE (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?vBfXhn3tf_vE.
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tion. Riverview started with no legacy issues of jealousy in guarding
billable hours or need to retain client credit, which makes it easier to
build a team approach.
With hiring focused on meeting the needs of particular long-term
clients, and tailoring skill sets to that client, Riverview Law has an
incentive to hire carefully for fit both in terms of Riverview culture and
client needs, and train and retain their employees to service the
long-term contracts. As a recent Harvard Business School case study
noted, Riverview founders worked to build “a culture of autonomy,
personal responsibility, a focus on quality, and trust between employees
and their managers.”90 Team members have an incentive to develop
strong client expertise and, unlike the billable hour model, if team
members leave then Riverview, not the client, will pay for the costs of
educating and training new team members. Of course, it is difficult to
penetrate whether there truly is autonomy, responsibility, and trust
within the Riverview model, but they at least give voice to these goals.
Although the initial gathering of business, legal, and technology
talent was from lateral hires, Riverview Law has begun to build its own
training program, offering seven training contracts in 2014, with plans
to award ten additional training contracts in 2015.91 Only current team
members can apply for the training contracts, so they encourage
“[b]udding solicitors” to join Riverview before the fall application to be
able to apply for one of these training contracts.92 This process allows
Riverview to assess cultural fit before making a significant training
commitment in new solicitors. This is a refreshing change from many
of the U.S. new delivery models, which often have little room for new
entrants.93 Karl Chapman, CEO of Riverview, has said publicly that “in
90. Gardner & Silverstein, supra note 83, at 5.
91. Riverview Law Awards Seven Training Contracts. Ten Training Contracts to be Offered in 2015,
RIVERVIEW LAW (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.riverviewlaw.com/riverview-law-awards-seven-training-
contracts-ten-training-contracts-offered-2015/; Riverview Solicitors, Business law Executive—
Commercial Paralegals, LAWYER (Apr. 29, 2014), http://jobs.thelawyer.com/job/873229/business-
law-executive-commercial-paralegals/.
92. Riverview Law Plans Manchester Office Opening Following 100% Revenue Growth, RIVERVIEW
LAW (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.riverviewlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Riverview-Law-
plans-Manchester-office-opening-following-revenue-growth.pdf [hereinafter Riverview Law Press
Release (Jan. 12, 2015)].
93. John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate
Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3021 (2014).
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the next 5-7 years, I should be fired as Chief Executive of Riverview Law
if we are still recruiting senior lawyers . . . . We should be growing our
own.”94
This investment in human capital also includes creating a work
environment that is more attractive to talented professionals. The goal
is to create “a strong corporate culture” in which “its hiring, onboard-
ing, performance management, and compensation system all rein-
forced the firm’s service culture.”95 This means that Riverview Law
spends a great deal of time on “recruitment, induction, and training” to
assure that employees understand “the company’s overall vision and its
specific strategy for a particular customer.”96 Riverview conducts much
of the day-to-day service in lower cost areas, such as their main offices in
Bromborough, Wirral, and Manchester.97 It emphasizes the liberating
effects of shedding the billable hour, and a “positive, energetic and
innovative environment.”98 They claim “competitive” salaries although
their website is understandably silent on specifics.99
3. Technology
A strong team model allows every member of the service team at
Riverview Law to contribute data and information. For some business
contracts they offer big data analytics by using a sophisticated IT
structure to monitor legal issues and claims and pinpoint patterns to
the client.100 With the commitment to long-term contracts, it becomes
in Riverview’s best interest to reduce the legal problems of the client.
Building a robust IT platform that was tailored to the needs of in-house
clients has allowed Riverview to launch two new endeavors. In Decem-
ber 2014, Riverview expanded its offerings to create a technology
business, creating a unit to license software modules to in-house legal
94. Stanford Panel, supra note 86.
95. Gardner & Silverstein, supra note 83, at 6. “Onboarding” is a business term that refers to
integrating a new employee into the work environment.
96. Id.
97. Riverview Law Press Release, supra note 92 (announcing opening of Manchester office).
98. Id.
99. See Current Vacancies, RIVERVIEW LAW, http://www.riverviewlaw.com/join-us/current-
vacancies/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
100. For a good description of legal process outsourcing such as Riverview Law, see Anthony
Notaras,Here be Monsters, LEGAL BUSINESS & CLUTCH GRP. (Feb. 2014), http://www.legalbusiness.co.
uk/tech_insight.pdf (insights of Christian Sommer, Legal Director-Volume Contracting,
Vodafone).
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teams and even competing law firms.101 This does not appear in the
original descriptions of Riverview’s business, but is a natural outgrowth
of its IT investments. Riverview has also undertaken a partnership with
University of Liverpool to bring the university’s computer science
expertise to the rapidly developing Riverview systems.102
4. Access to Capital
This business model requires heavy investment in personnel and
technology in order to service the long-term contracts, and the market-
ing and business development necessary to acquire those contracts.
The investors created an entity called LawVest and the initial business
plan anticipated ten years before they would reach profitability. The
firm has grown more rapidly than anticipated and it is on track to
become profitable. Among Riverview Law’s key early investors are DLA
Piper, one of the three largest law firms in the world, and AdviserPlus,
the outsourcing firm that provided at least part of the business model
for Riverview.103 Having DLA Piper as a key investor means that this
cohort of owners understands the professional obligations of Riverview.
But even the non-lawyer owners know that they are building a business
in a regulated enterprise, so that compliance is a central obligation of
the business.
5. Lessons for the U.S. Market
The Riverview Law model might in theory be possible in the United
States—flat fees, long term contracts, and heavy IT investment are
occurring at some firms.104 But the Riverview model required an
investment of approximately £10million ($15million) in setting up the
101. Creation of Technology Business and Launch of Software as a Service Solutions for In-House
Teams, RIVERVIEW LAW (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.riverviewlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
12/14.12.08-Creation-of-Technology-Business-and-launch-of-Software-as-a-Service-solutions-for-In-
house-teams.pdf.
102. Riverview Law and University of Liverpool Announce Artificial Intelligence Partnership, RIVER-
VIEW LAW (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.riverviewlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/15.02.06-
Riverview-Law-and-University-of-Liverpool-announce-Artificial-Intelligence-partnership.pdf.
103. See LawVest Launches Riverview Brand, SOLICITOR’S JOURNAL (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.
solicitorsjournal.com/news/management/technology/lawvest-launches-riverview-brand.
104. See Dzienkowski, supra note 93, at 3002-15. Prof. Jonathan Molot recommends that law
firms embrace an alternative capital structure that provides permanent equity as a way to
encourage firms to build long-term value. Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A
Corporate Finance Solution to Law Firm Short-Termism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2014) (concluding
that it makes sense to allow some portion of equity to be held by non-lawyers in order to broaden
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system. There are many barriers to obtaining that kind of investment by
U.S. firms. One significant challenge is whether the firms would be able
to buy the business expertise needed to launch this model. Individuals
with business and IT knowledge who are risk-takers and willing to invest
their labors in a service industry start-up are likely to want the ability to
be more than a paid employee. They will want to have an equity
interest. In addition, the relentless pressure of the AmLaw 100 and
emphasis on profits per partner pressures U.S. law firms to have more
immediate payout of profits rather than significant investment into the
firm. For mid-size and smaller firm lawyers, it is a huge financial risk to
invest millions of dollars in a new enterprise, rather than to take the
profits. Even if a firm were willing to make that kind of investment, only
the wealthiest firms and individual partners are able to make that kind
of investment. In terms of outside investment, the traditional way to
access capital in U.S. law firms is through bank loans. But what rational
bank would invest that kind of money in a law firm start up?
As noted above, another advantage of the ABS structure is mind-set
and attitude. The mindset issues are twofold. First, as Prof. Bill Hender-
son has argued, large U.S. law firms are a victim of their own success,
with a locked-in business structure that is difficult to change.105 In an
Indiana University Law School competition set up in 2009 to build a
new business model for U.S. law firms, all four teams came up with the
same basic attributes of customized alternative billing arrangements,
new data collection, information sharing with clients, and intensive
training.106 Under this business model associates took lower salaries in
exchange for better long-term career prospects, training and more
attractive firm culture.107 Strikingly, these are attributes of the River-
view Law model. But Riverview did not have the “baggage” of an
existing firm.108 Why should partners in a U.S. law firm with a large
book of business invest in this model, rather than elect a short-term and
less risky path of moving to another firm that would allow the partner
to maintain high per partner profits, or simply taking their profits? If
the universe of potential shareholders and accommodate the risk profiles and time horizons of law
firm lawyers).
105. Bill Henderson, What Ails the Large Law Firm: Will the Real FutureFirm Please Stand Up,
SUMMIT LAW GRP. 1, 4-5 (Apr. 2014), http://www.summitlaw.com/uploads/pdf/what-ails-the-big-
law-firms-monograph.pdf (convincing the partnership to adopt new strategies “is a change
management problem of epic proportions”).
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 9.
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the most profitable partners leave, the firm goes into a death spiral.109
Bill Henderson concludes that the problem ailing U.S. law firms is “the
settled expectations and dulled imagination produced by several de-
cades of large profits and high prestige.”110
The second mindset problem is the tendency of experienced U.S.
lawyers to want control. The ABS model envisions that a team of service
professionals can come together as equals. The ABS model requires
that the team, whether solicitors, barristers, licensed conveyancers, IT,
or managers, knows it has professional obligations to maintain confi-
dences and avoid conflicts, and is exposed to professional malpractice
if it violates fiduciary duties.
An ongoing concern of any new delivery model is monitoring the
quality of the legal services provided. Corporate actors, Riverview Law’s
target clients, are generally more sophisticated and have greater ability
to monitor for quality and assess value in light of the business needs. It
seems likely that this Riverview structure will encourage at least as
much, if not more, attention to client needs, as the client defines them,
than U.S. models of service delivery.
One emerging area of concern has to do with how ABS structure can
erode the more public-minded aspects of lawyering. Lawyers, in theory,
have three professional obligations: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.”111 The vast majority of attention is given to client focus, and
the ABS structure holds promise to improve in many cases the client
service.
The second and third obligations—officer of the legal system and a
public citizen with special responsibility for the quality of justice—are
less clear. Again, it is not apparent that the current regulatory structure
puts much emphasis on these obligations beyond limiting lying to a
court and third persons. With outside investors it is not clear howmuch
emphasis will be placed on contributing to pro bono activities and
putting resources into that special responsibility to improve justice.
Corporate entities in the modern era do have some room for public-
interest activities, but they are mostly captured by the corporate social
responsibility movement. But there appears to be a risk that profit
maximization and efficiency concerns may squeeze out these public
109. Id. at 9.
110. Id.
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2013).
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duties. Again, it is difficult to assess how this risk compares to the
serious challenges of promoting public duties, such as pro bono, in the
current U.S. service delivery models. Riverview Lawmentions its “collec-
tive responsibility” and that it is “committed to positively impacting our
colleagues, [its] business . . . customers businesses and the wider com-
munity” and has a commitment to “act with integrity and are proud of
what we do, the role we play in supporting each other and our
customers and in shaping the legal profession.”112 It is unclear, how-
ever, whether the fast-growing Riverview business has actually included
those more public dimensions in their work beyond excellent client
service.
C. Co-Operative Legal Services
1. The Hope
Co-Operative Legal Services Limited was one of the first three ABS
firms approved by the Solicitors Regulation Authority.113 The poster-
child of the promise of ABS, it builds on a strong cooperative model in
which the firm is owned by its workers, customers and suppliers.114
Technically most law firms are also cooperatives because they are
owned by their lawyers/workers. The U.K. Co-operative Legal Services
is significantly different because the owners include a wide range of
individuals and are not limited to lawyers. It currently has 8.2 million
members, who join essentially for free.115
The Co-Operative Group’s move into legal services was highly sym-
bolic for two reasons. It was the first national retail chain to be
authorized as an ABS. It represents a major “brand” with a strong
identity in other sectors (food, funeral services, and banking) that
could be used to jump start a legal services unit.116 Additionally, the
Co-Operative Group focuses on providing legal services to individuals
and emphasizes “easy access to quality legal services at a price they can
112. Our Values, RIVERVIEW LAW, http://www.riverviewlaw.com/our-approach/ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015).
113. ABS License, Solicitor’s Regulation Authority, COOP. LEGAL SERVS. LTD. (Mar. 27, 2012),
https://sra.org.uk/solicitors/firm-based-authorisation/abs-register/567391.page.
114. Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 901 (2014). For
additional discussion of Co-operative Legal Services, see Robinson, supra note 12, at Part II(A)(ii).
115. The Co-Operative Membership, COOP. GRP., http://www.co-operative.coop/membership/
What-is-membership-all-about/ (last updated Aug. 31, 2015). One pound is deducted from the
member’s first share of the profits.
116. Cf. Corporate Practice of Law, supra note 1, § 5.1.
U.K. ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES
2016] 691
afford,” which promotes the LSA goal of enhancing affordable legal
services.117
The Co-Operative Group, which started this ABS law firm, has one
of the highest profile cooperative operations in the United King-
dom.118 The Co-Operative banks, grocery stores, and funeral services
are well-recognized entities.119 The self-proclaimed common theme
running through all The Co-Operative services is “ethical.” This core
approach has been part of The Co-Operative Group’s identity since it
started in the late 1800s. With a strong consumer service orientation, it
made sense that The Co-Operative Group would move into legal
services. It initially offered legal services through a model of affiliations
with solicitors who agreed to offer services at a set fee and abide by
minimum standards. This essentially aligned the Co-Operative brand
with the selected pool of solicitors, signaling a blend of quality and
117. About Us, COOP. LEGAL SERVS., https://www.co-oplegalservices.co.uk/about-us/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2016). The Ethical Consumer Magazine reader survey ranked The Co-operative
Group as the most ethical company in the UK over the past 25 years. The Most Ethical Companies of
the Last 25 Years, ETHICAL CONSUMER (Aug. 4, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/
latestnews/entryid/1645/the-most-ethical-companies-of-the-last-25-years.aspx.
118. While co-operatives took a hard hit in the post-World War II era, pockets survived and
thrived. John K. Walton, The Post-War Decline of the British Retail Co-operative Movement: Nature, Causes
and Consequences, in CONSUMERISM AND THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN MODERN BRITISH HISTORY:
TAKING STOCK 13, 13-31 (Lawrence Black & Nicole Robertson eds., 2009). The cooperative models
in the U.K. “were perceived as part of a wider working-class struggle to achieve a good standard of
life in the face of urban and rural adversities.” Chris Wrigley, The Commemorative Urge: The
Co-Operative Movement’s Collective Memory, in CONSUMERISM AND THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN
MODERN BRITISH HISTORY: TAKING STOCK 157, 157 (Lawrence Black &Nicole Robertson eds., 2009).
US cooperatives often emerge from the same sentiment. (Anyone who has seen It’s a Wonderful Life
knows that George Bailey, Jimmy Stewart’s character, runs a cooperative mutual fund for the
purpose of breaking the power of the financially dominant and evil Henry Potter.) IT’S A
WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
119. The Co-operative Group brand has a long history. Originally started in 1844 by a group
of skilled workers known as the Rochdale Pioneers, the founders established a profit sharing
system and achieved official corporate status in 1862. Over the next 160 years the group would
engage in a variety of mergers with other cooperatives, acquisitions and collaborations. The
Co-operative Group now had over 6 million members and approximately 80 independent
cooperative societies.Our History, COOP. GRP., http://www.co-operative.coop/corporate/aboutus/
ourhistory/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015); Our History: 1901-1950, COOP. GRP., http://www.co-
operative.coop/corporate/aboutus/ourhistory/19011950/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015); Our His-
tory: 1951-2000, COOP. GRP., http://www.co-operative.coop/corporate/aboutus/ourhistory/1951-
2000/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015); Our History: 2001-Present, COOP. GRP., http://www.co-operative.
coop/corporate/aboutus/ourhistory/2001present/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). The Co-operative
Group is the parent company with subsidiaries (holding society) offering Financial Services
(banking and insurance), groceries and funeral services. Our Democratic Structure, COOP. GRP.,
http://www.co-operative.coop/corporate/aboutus/our-democracy/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
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price.120 This model in theory could satisfy many of the core institu-
tional values of The Co-Operative Group.
The formation of an ABS by The Co-Operative Group allowed them
to offer direct legal services by hiring and supervising solicitors to
handle the legal work for their target services. The Co-Operative
Group’s legal services match their target audience of middle-income
individuals and families: family and relationships, wills probate, per-
sonal injury, conveyancing, and employment.121
The backing of the much larger Co-Operative Group allowed the
legal unit to invest heavily to set up an office and hire hundreds of
personnel and gave them the resources to incur losses until they built
their book of business. Their physical operations are primarily in
Manchester City, Bristol and London.
In all legal services, access to customers is a huge issue and The
Co-Operative was well equipped to link its legal services to preexisting
offerings. Set out in Appendix A is a brochure from The Co-operative
Funeral Services. The full brochure has five references to the ability to
obtain legal services if needed for settling the estate of a loved one.
Similarly, the Co-operative Banking Services website and brochures
refer customers to The Co-Operative Legal Services Helpline.122
In Spring 2013, The Co-Operative Group began a clever marketing
campaign of commercials, emphasizing that most lawyers make clients
feel small and child-like, but the Co-Operative Legal Services “prom-
ised to be straight-forward with fixed fees for a range of legal needs.”123
Given the range of services, such as estate, family law, conveyancing,
and personal injury work,124 good service may also allow the Co-
Operative Group to have repeat customers.
Given the Co-Op’s strong consumer focus, it seemed well-structured
to avoid the erosion of professional values. Christina Blacklaws, former
Director of Policy of Co-Operative Legal Services pointed out that the
ability to function as an ABS in the co-operative model allowed them to
avoid “the competing and conflicting interests” of a partnership in the
120. See STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 117, 127-43 (discussing branding).
121. COOP. LEGAL SERVS., http://www.co-operativelegalservices.co.uk/ (last visited Nov. 28,
2015). Their motto is “The co-operative legal services: here for you for life.” Id.
122. Privilege and Privilege Premier Current Accounts, COOP. BANK, http://www.co-operativebank.
co.uk/currentaccounts/privilege (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
123. See The Co-operative Legal Services, Co-operative Legal Services Advert Voice of Law 2014,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?vXdbuFY9Euus. See also Capper
Digital, The Making of Co-operative Legal Services Advert, YOUTUBE (June 12, 2013), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?vmCY5Opp9VUU.
124. COOP. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 121.
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traditional practice of law.125 “We are fortunate that we have internal
funding where we don’t have to compromise our integrity or vision.”126
As other commentators noted, “[c]rucially, as a mutual, it is not under
the same pressure as its quoted competitors to generate short-term
gains for institutional shareholders. The Co-Op can therefore afford to
play a longer game in the new world of Alternative [B]usiness
Structures.”127
2. The Reality
One major challenge of aligning legal services with a major brand is
that the erosion of both the financial stability and brand in other units
may negatively impact the legal unit. The Co-Operative Bank was part
of a rescue plan in 2013, reducing The Co-Operative Group’s share of
the banking business.128 In addition, the company was rocked by very
disruptive management issues that resulted in significant restructuring
in 2014.129 These events resulted in major financial and reputational
hits for The Co-Operative group. In addition, the rapid changes in the
legal services personal injury market put further stress on Co-Operative
Legal Services.
In April 2014, Christine Blacklaws, the well-respected director of
Co-Operative Legal Services left the CLS to form an ABS consultant
service.130 The 2014 financials indicate that the legal services unit
revenues were down from £33m to £23m.131 The Cooperative Annual
Statement attributes this to changes in the personal injury market.132
At first blush this revenue decline looks ominous, but the Groupmoved
125. Baker Tilly, LEGAL INNOVATION 2013: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN AN OLD PROFESSION 13, 21
(June 2013), http://www.paganosborne.com/documents/Legal_innovation_2013.pdf.
126. Id. at 13.
127. Avrom Sherr & Simon Thompson, Tesco Law and Tesco Lawyers: Will Our Needs Change if
the Market Develops, 3 ON˜ATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 3, 595, 605 (2013), http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/
osls/article/viewFile/293/259.
128. COOP. BANK PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2013 3, 12, 30 (2014), http://www.co-
operativebank.co.uk/assets/pdf/bank/investorrelations/financialresults/bank-r-and-a.pdf.
129. COOP. GRP. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2014 21 (2015), http://www.co-operative.coop/
Corporate/PDFs/Annual-Report/2014/Co-operative-Group-Annual-Report-2014.pdf.
130. Neil Rose, Exclusive: Major Blow to Co-op Legal Services as Blacklaws Departs, LEGAL FUTURES
(Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/exclusive-major-blow-co-op-legal-
services-blacklaws-departs.
131. COOP. GRP. LTD., ANNUAL REVIEW 2014 10 (2015), http://www.co-operative.coop/
Membership/2015/IYB/agm2015/ANNUAL_REVIEW_2014.pdf.
132. Id.
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from a £2.3 billion loss in 2013 to a £216 million profit in 2014.133 The
ability to have the emerging legal unit supported by other divisions is
the advantage of combining services. The question is how strong The
Co-Operative Group is committed to its legal services. To date, they
claim a very strong commitment. CLS is focusing on its core business of
legal advice, probate and estate administration, personal injury, employ-
ment, wills, family law and conveyancing.134 These are the legal needs
of middle income individuals, who are the Co-Operative Group’s target
users for all of their services. The access to capital allows the business to
weather these rocky initial years and gives more space for the practice
to take off.
The ABS model allows The Co-Operative Group to build on the
economies of scale and integrate services between and among its
various units. The alternative of a referral service prevents the legal unit
from monitoring quality control and obtaining economies of scale by
bringing the legal services in-house. Most important, the ABS structure
allowed the legal unit to weather a rough business year. Had it been a
traditional law firm, without outside support, it presumably would have
closed.
D. LegalZoom
LegalZoom is the first U.S. business to be licensed as an ABS firm.135
The U.S. business model is well known, although often misunderstood
by lawyers who simply see it as a static library of forms. LegalZoom
provides online guidance to lead their primary users, individuals and
small businesses, to the proper and tailored form to meet their goals.136
The forms are designed for use in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and can be tailored to 2,900 U.S. counties.137 For $149, plus
the state filing fee, you can create a limited liability corporation.138
There are categories to assist in “Running Your Business,” such as
133. Id. at 6.
134. About Legal Services, COOP. CAREERS PORTAL, http://www.co-operative.jobs/legal-services/
about-legal-services/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
135. Neil Rose, Here Come the Americans: LegalZoom Gains ABS License, LEGAL FUTURES (Jan. 7,
2015), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/come-americans-legalzoom-gains-abs-licence.
136. LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
137. LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at p.3 (May 12, 2012)
(hereinafter LegalZoom Registration Statement), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/128
6139/000104746912005763/a2209299zs-1.htm.
138. LLC (Limited Liability Company), LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/limited-liability-
company/limited-liability-company-overview.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
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corporate documents (by-laws, annual reports, corporate minutes),
trademarks, patents, compliance, and leases.139 You can prepare a will
and trust, file for bankruptcy and divorce, prepare a prenuptial agree-
ment and find resources relevant to a host of other personal legal
services. Need a Pet Protection Agreement? LegalZoom has one to
tailor for your needs. In addition to the “portfolio of interactive legal
documents,” they also offer “subscription legal plans and registered
agent services.”140 With over two million business and family users,
LegalZoom has very high name recognition in the United States.141
In the United States, LegalZoom has to carefully moderate its
business model to avoid running afoul of unauthorized practice of law
concerns. In small print at the bottom of what appears to be every page
is the following disclaimer:
Disclaimer: Communications between you and LegalZoom are
protected by our Privacy Policy but not by the attorney-client
privilege or as work product. LegalZoom provides access to
independent attorneys and self-help services at your specific
direction. We are not a law firm or a substitute for an attorney
or law firm. We cannot provide any kind of advice, explanation,
opinion, or recommendation about possible legal rights, rem-
edies, defenses, options, selection of forms or strategies. Your
access to the website is subject to our Terms of Use.142
This disclaimer is essential to maneuver around unauthorized practice
requirements in the United States. A few states have challenged the
LegalZoom service, but have succeeded primarily in assuring this
disclaimer.143 The claim that they do not provide “any kind of advice,
139. The list of LegalZoom business services is available online at Our Business Products,
LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/index-new-c.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
140. LegalZoom Registration Statement, supra note 137, at 1.
141. See id. at 1-2. According to their Registration Statement, LegalZoom has a 60% aided
brand awareness (i.e. survey respondents recognized the brand with a prompt).
142. LEGALZOOM, supra note 136.
143. Janson v. LegalZoom, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1064 (W.D. Mo. 2011); LegalZoom.
com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Ark. 2013); LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar,
No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL 1213242, at *5 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014). For a fuller analysis of
LegalZoom’s place in the market for legal services, see BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE
DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 85-103(2015) (analyzing LegalZoom and other
online providers as a form of “death from below” where the new providers target low-margin work
that is neglected by traditional firms, improve the quality and efficiency of the services and begin
to take higher-end work).
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explanation, opinion or recommendation” is a legal fiction.144 It is
hard to envision how a robust online body of legal documents, along
with computer guided questions that tailor the documents to the users’
goals, can be developed without a functional legal analysis and recom-
mendation embedded in it. In anticipation of a public offering, Legal-
Zoom filed an extensive SEC Registration Statement in 2012.145 It
devoted a full page in large font to declare that “[e]veryone deserves
access to quality legal services so they can benefit from the full
protection of the law.”146 In LegalZoom’s own framing, it provides legal
services for purposes of SEC filings, but not legal services for purposes
of unauthorized practice of law statutes.147
The acceptance of this legal fiction is not surprising. A broad
interpretation of unauthorized practice statutes is increasingly intellec-
tually indefensible, especially because of a concern that the impetus to
exclude others is motivated by a desire to give lawyers a competitive
advantage.148 Readily available information on the internet and other
online resources makes consumers skeptical of a claim that legal
documents cannot be delivered in a cost effective manner for routine
matters.
In the United States, LegalZoom maintains a relationship with a
pre-vetted list of attorneys with their subscription legal plan.149 It
essentially connects customers to independent attorneys. The subscrip-
tion plan provides for follow-up consultation, document review, and
discounts for subsequent legal services.150
The 2012 LegalZoom Registration Statement did not lead to a public
offering. Its growth, while healthy, did not appear to offer sufficient
appeal to the market.151 Instead, LegalZoom ultimately raised funds
144. LEGALZOOM, supra note 136.
145. LegalZoom Registration Statement, supra note 137.
146. Id. (referring to the Introduction).
147. Id. at 3-4.
148. SeeN. Carolina St. Board of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015); Goldfarb
v. Virginia St. Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788, 793 (1975); Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and
Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2012); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal
Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008).
149. Legal Plan Attorney Directory, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/
advantage-attorneys (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
150. LegalZoom Registration Statement, supra note 137, at 4.
151. Michael Carney, The $425M LegalZoom Deal is a Win for VCs, but Less Exciting for the
Company or LA, PANDO (Jan. 6, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/01/06/the-legalzoom-deal-is-a-
win-for-vcs-but-less-exciting-for-the-company-or-la/.
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from a European private-equity firm, Permira, with reported invest-
ment of approximately $240 million.152
LegalZoom was monitoring the regulatory changes in the United
Kingdom from the early stages and is now actively expanding into the
U.K. market.153 Its ABS license became effective on January 7, 2015. As
part of that expansion, LegalZoom recruited Craig Holt from Quality-
Solicitors to run the LegalZoom U.K. and build the law firm.154 As of
the writing of this article, the firm is not yet fully launched.
There are three likely advantages that the ABS structure will offer to
the U.K. LegalZoom. First, by identifying as a law firm, LegalZoom will
be able to integrate its online materials with the advisory services of
solicitors. One goal of ABS structure, according to Craig Holt, is to give
LegalZoom “broader freedom in how we work with lawyers.”155 It can
more closely monitor the work product, rather than simply handing off
the case to a separate solicitor. This, in theory, could result in en-
hanced consistency, quality control, and a stronger feedback loop so
that the solicitors have an ongoing incentive to improve the Legal-
Zoom product. The flip-side question is whether that monitoring will
result in a floor of minimally acceptable work-product rather than
more tailored, bespoke work that may be more expensive. Again,
however, it is unknown whether lawyers in traditional firms (i.e., no
outside owners or investors) that offer high-volume legal services also
have pressure to cut corners. With a widely known national brand and
easy ability for consumers to report whether they have had a good or
bad experience, LegalZoom would have a strong business incentive to
correct failures. It also has a business and professional need to analyze
more closely what constitutes quality in legal services provided by
attorneys, beyond simply capturing client satisfaction.156 Having inte-
grated services provides a database to study more deeply this question.
Beyond integration, providing services as a law firm will allow Legal-
Zoom to offer long-term services to individual and small-business
152. Current Investment: LegalZoom, PERMIRA, http://www.permira.com/technology/
investments/legalzoom (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
153. Interview with Edward Hartman, Co-founder, LegalZoom (Oct. 31, 2015).
154. LegalZoom had a “soft launch” in the UK through collaboration with QualitySolicitors.
Craig Holt has left QualitySolicitors and will work on building the new LegalZoom law firm. See
Neil Rose, Exclusive: “We will be biggest brand in UK,” says LegalZoom, LEGAL FUTURES (Dec. 18, 2014),
http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/exclusive-we-will-biggest-brand-uk-says-legalzoom.
155. John Hyde, Legal Zoom Enters Market with ABS Licence, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/legalzoom-enters-market-with-abs-licence/5045879.
fullarticle (quoting Craig Holt).
156. Interview with Edward Hartman, supra note 153.
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clients, following the client through the range of needs that one
encounters in our legally-driven world. As LegalZoom’s knowledge,
experience and database grows more sophisticated, it can implement
its mission to provide affordable access to more sophisticated services
to its target clients.157 As it states in their mission, “putting the law
within reach of millions of people is more than just a novel idea—it’s
the founding principle.”158 The integration of lawyers with the Legal-
Zoom online services will allow affordable partnerships between the
clients and their lawyers. This partnership is a deepening of the services
envisioned by LegalZoom.
The most provocative consequence of becoming licensed as an ABS
firm is that LegalZoom is submitting itself to regulation. Much of what
it does would not constitute reserve activity in the United Kingdom and
could be done without being called a law firm. But by embracing the
ABS license, and embracing the regulatory standards concerning good
management and professional conduct, and maintaining malpractice
insurance, that broad disclaimer on the U.S. site would not apply in the
United Kingdom. It is the practice of law, it will have attorney-client
privilege to the extent it is recognized in the United Kingdom, and it
will have all the fiduciary obligations that are imposed on solicitors
offering legal services. In the United States, the users of its services are
called customers; in the United Kingdom, they will be clients.159 It
appears that LegalZoom clients/consumers in the United Kingdom
will receive greater protection than their counterpart consumers in the
United States.160
This decision to submit to regulation is a very positive signal for the
legal profession. Being able to call itself a law firm, and building a team
of solicitors who will have or develop expertise needed to service their
clients, is a signal that the solicitor brand—for lack of a better word—is
powerful and valuable. It is signal of quality and professionalism.
E. The Personal Injury Market
ABS firms have had a huge impact on the personal injury (PI) market
in the United Kingdom. By 2014, one-third of personal injury turnover
157. See Sarah Knapp, Note, Can LegalZoom be the Answer to the Justice Gap?, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 821 (2013).
158. About Us, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/about-us (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
159. Interview with Edward Hartman, supra note 153.
160. See Knapp, supra note 157, at 835-36 (arguing that allowing LegalZoom to practice as a
firm would “reduce risk to consumers while still providing the legal services they need”).
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(billings) were from ABS firms.161 The rapid change and consolidation
in this practice area were driven by what many perceived as inefficien-
cies in the market and by other regulatory changes that banned referral
fees and changed some aspects of fee shifting in personal injury
litigation.162 Onemight legitimately fear that opening up the PI market
to non-lawyer owners and investors would encourage the entry of
“low-price/low-quality” suppliers.163 As developed in greater detail in
the final section, it is difficult at this point to assess quality changes in
legal services in this area.
The PI market in the United Kingdom is very large, with almost one
million claims, mostly small, brought in 2014-15.164 About twenty years
ago, the U.K. market saw a rise in claims management companies
(CMCs), which in the most positive models offered integrated services,
so that an individual involved in an accident could make one phone
call and have access to advice and services in medical care, car repair,
car rental, insurance and related issues.165 After significant concerns
about abuse and the encouragement of a “compensation culture,”
CMCs became regulated. Law firms began to offer claims-processing
even before ABS structure was allowed. With the advent of ABS form,
law firms are moving rapidly to take over CMC functions and offering
integrated services.
Below are brief descriptions of two firms that have had a role in
reshaping the personal injury practice in the United Kingdom.
1. Minster Law
Minster Law was founded in 2003 by Adrian Christmas. Soon after
the Legal Services Act of 2007, Minster began strategic acquisition of
other practices to build its personal-injury caseload. Minster also worked
161. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Research on alternative business structures (ABSs):
Findings from surveys with ABSs and applicants that withdrew from the licensing process, May
2014), 3, file:///C:/Users/MCMORROW/Downloads/abs-quantitative-research-may-2014%
20(3).pdf; Nick Hilborne, ABSs Capture a Third of Personal Injury Market, SRA Research Reveals, LEGAL
FUTURES (June 12, 2014), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/abss-capture-third-personal-
injury-market-sra-research-reveals.
162. RICHARD LEWIS, STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE NUMBER AND COST OF PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS IN THE TORT SYSTEM, (May 8, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id2604039.
163. See STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 28 (using phrase to analyze whether advertising results in
reduction of quality; states that “where price advertising is undertaken mostly by low-price/low-
quality suppliers, price advertising will be an adverse signal of quality”).
164. LEWIS, supra note 162, at 4.
165. See, e.g., WINN SOLICITORS, http://www.winnassist.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).
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with BGL, a financial services group that includes a consumer-
insurance unit, to manage its claims-processing for BGL’s motor and
bike-insurance customers. With 800 employees and income reported to
be £107m, Minster specializes in personal injury, wills, probate, and
conveyancing.166 In 2013, the BGL Group received an ABS license and
purchased Minster, effectively making it a law firm owned by a com-
pany with insurance interests.167
An insurance company owning a law firm is one area that U.S.
commentators flag as of deep concern because of the conflict of
interests that that may arise.168 The firm, however, is subject to the SRA
conflict-of-interest regulations, which would preclude Minster Law
from suing BGL. A more subtle issue is the possibility that the solicitors
will not develop aggressive theories of recovery for fear of impairing the
long-term financial interests of the insurance group owner. That
certainly is a theoretical concern, but the vast majority of claims are
very small matters that do not involve significant legal issues.169 One
particular risk of this ownership model is that with individual rather
than institutional clients, it may be difficult for clients to discern
whether the lawyers are pulling punches.170 It is difficult to assess based
on the current limited experience whether this is a real risk, or whether
it is any greater than the similar risk that exists in the US.
Minster Law presents to the world as a traditional law firm offering
traditional legal services.171 In its public statements about public dimen-
sions of its work it emphasizes corporate social responsibility, the
public-interest language of corporations, including BLG.172 Minster’s
contributions to making the world a better place are unconnected to
the professional services of law. There is no mention of pro bono or
other activities. This may simply be part of a general U.K. approach to
pro bono, or may be a subtle consequence of corporate ownership, or
both.
166. Neil Rose, Here come the Meerkats as BGL Group acquires Minster Law in biggest law firm sale,
LEGAL FUTURES (May 31, 2013), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/here-come-meerkats-
bgl-group-acquires-minster-law-biggest-law-firm-sale.
167. About Page. MINSTER LAW (2015), https://www.minsterlaw.co.uk/about/.
168. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 21.
169. LEWIS, supra note 162, at 28-29.
170. See supra Part IV for discussion of quality and legal services as a credence good.
171. Id.
172. Reducing poverty, creating prosperity: our Corporate Social Responsibility policy, MINSTER LAW
(2015), https://www.minsterlaw.co.uk/about/corporate-social-responsibility/.
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2. Winn Legal Services
Winn Solicitors and its related entity Winn Assists, a claims manage-
ment company, provide a slightly different model of a Solicitor-CMC.
Initially developed by Jeff Winn in 2002, this Newcastle-based firm has
had a rapid rise.173 With over 200 employees in 2014 and growing, and
thirty-seven solicitors, it is a highly automated firm that can process a
large volume of small claims through the use of technology.174 It is
reported to have turnover of £45 million.175
After becoming an ABS firm, in 2013 Winn sold 60% ownership in
the firm to private equity investors JZ International and Souter Invest-
ments.176 The Winn core management team owns the remaining 40%.
All owners sit on the parent-company board.177 The influx of capital
has allowed Winn Solicitors to expand to take advantage of the rapid
consolidation in the U.K. accident management field.178
As a service industry that encourages customer feedback, both of
these large volume personal injury firms are heavily reliant on client
affirmation of the quality of services. This creates a strong incentive to
173. Andy Richardson, A crash course in business growth, NORTHERN ECHO (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/business/meettheboss/11561642.A_crash_course_in_
business_growth/.
174. Proclaim case management software: Winn Solicitors, MINSTER LAW (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.
legalsupportnetwork.co.uk/practice-management/videos/proclaim-case-management-software-
winn-solicitors; ECLIPSE LEGAL SYSTEMS, WINN SOLICITORS: PROCLAIM PROVIDES FLEXIBLE, SCALABLE
SOLUTION FOR RAPIDLY EXPANDING PI FIRM, http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/wpcs/eclipse/
Winn%20Solicitors.pdf.
175. Corena Ford, Newcastle Law Firm Winn Solicitors on the Acquisition Trail, THE JOURNAL (May
1, 2014), http://www.thejournal.co.uk/business/business-news/newcastle-law-firm-winn-solicitors-
7060950.
176. Souter Makes Significant Investment In Legal Company, SOUTER INVESTMENTS (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.souterinvestments.com/news/souter-makes-significant-investment-n10154-s11.aspx.
For a reference to regulated industries, see Neil Rose, PE-fuelled Winns targets expansion after
“nightmare” ABS process, LEGAL FUTURES (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/
pe-fuelled-winns-targets-expansion-nightmare-abs-process; Winn Secures Significant Investment For
Expansion, BEATTIE GROUP (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.beattiegroup.com/prclients/pr-press-
releases/2013/september/winn-secures-significant-investment-for-expansion.aspx.
177. Winn Secures Significant Investment For Expansion, BEATTIE GROUP (Sept. 3, 2013), http://
www.beattiegroup.com/prclients/pr-press-releases/2013/september/winn-secures-significant-
investment-for-expansion.aspx.
178. Company Overview of Winn Solicitors Limited, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 17, 2015,
10:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId1138
95379; Dan Warburton,Winn Solicitors boss unveils plans to grow business, THE JOURNAL (Feb. 6, 2013,
8:26 AM), http://www.thejournal.co.uk/business/business-news/winn-solicitors-boss-unveils-plans-
4396504.
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build customer satisfaction.179 This can also serve as a check on abuse
or neglect.
F. Non-Profit ABS Firms
Three recent ABS firms are examples of non-profit entities creating a
specialty ABS law firm to support the non-profit goals. In April 2013,
Community Advice and Law Services (CALS), a non-profit, was granted
an ABS license to establish Castle Park Solicitors Community Interest
Company. CALS was the first non-profit authorized to own an ABS.180
The law firm targets middle-income clients and offers family law,
employment, and immigration services. The profits from the law firm
will be used to support CALS free legal aid in the areas of housing and
debt issues. According to public statements at the time of the ABS, the
ABS form allows for a clear distinction between the paid and the free
legal services. 181 Even with this distinction, the law firm provides
services to low and middle-income clients and offers both fixed fees
and reduced rates to some clients.182
Nothing in U.S. regulatory structure would prevent partners of a law
firm from agreeing to limit their salary or donate revenues in excess of
costs to a non-profit. This is cumbersome and essentially a statement of
pro bono commitment or philanthropy that rarely happens. Lawyers
might attempt to create a U.S. benefit corporation, a new corporate
form that allows the business entity to consider social interests.183 A full
analysis of a public benefit corporation is beyond the scope of this
article, but as with ABS firms, these new corporate forms would need to
make clear that client interests come before general social interests.184
179. Winn Solicitors has received extensive online reviews from users. See, e.g.,
Winnsolicitors.com reviews, TRUSTPILOT.COM, https://uk.trustpilot.com/review/winnsolicitors.com;
Winn Solicitors Reviews, TRUSTMARK.REVIEWS, http://trustmark.reviews/review/www.winnsolicitors.
com.
180. Rose, supra note 8.
181. The SRA lifted an earlier restriction on in-house lawyers who work for non-profits from
charging for their work. While this suggests the ABS structure in theory is not needed, CALS saw
an advantage of the ABS structure.
182. Catherine Baksi, Charity sets up its own law practice, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/charity-sets-up-its-own-law-practice/72114.article.
183. See, e.g., Being a B Corp, WENDEL ROSEN, http://www.wendel.com/about-us/b-corp (last
Jan. 25, 2016).
184. Carolyn Elefant, Can a Law Firm Be a B- Corporation?, MYSHINGLE (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://myshingle.com/2012/03/articles/entity-choice/can-a-law-firm-b-a-b-corporation-not-
ethically-in-my-view/.
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This is also not the same as agreeing that profits will go to support a
specific non-profit endeavor.
BMA Law is a law firm established by the British Medical Association
to provide advice to doctors.185 BMA Law offers assistance in drafting
partnership agreements, conveyancing, will writing, and legal advice
from healthcare specialists.186 Any surplus is put back into services for
doctors.187 They offer services to the general public, but members of
the British Medical Association and their families receive preferential
fees.188 The initiative is a joint venture with NewLaw Solicitors, a
Cardiff-based law firm.189
Unionline is an ABS formed by two of the United Kingdom’s largest
trade unions, GMB and Communication Workers Union. The two
unions have almost one million workers,190 which will serve as a natural
feeder to the ABS firm. Profits from the firm will go back to the unions.
The firm has created a helpline and uses a blend of referrals to existing
panel of law firms and keeping some work in-house.191 Like Co-
Operative Legal Services, the union-owned law firm aligns itself with a
strong pro-worker perspective. As with BMA Law, the firm should
develop enhanced expertise to address the legal issues of their trade
medical or union clients. In each, the firm is required to maintain the
confidences of the client.
If BMA Law and Unionline tried to form in the United States, they
might create a referral system (typically without compensation so that it
does not run afoul of limits on referral fees).192 They also might
negotiate group discounts or create a legal services plan. All of these
U.S. approaches, however, envision that the profits go to the lawyers. As
185. About Us, BMALAW, http://www.bmalaw.co.uk/about (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).
186. Id.
187. Id. The British Medical Association created an independent, non-profit ABS firm to
provide advice to doctors, including commercial property, trusts and estates, immigration,
mediation, and regulatory issues. Membership, BMALaw, http://www.bma.org.uk/membership/
bma-law (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).
188. Id.
189. Nick Hilborne, The Solicitor Will See You Now: British Medical Association sets up ABS for
doctors, LEGALFUTURES (May 6, 2015), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/the-solicitor-will-
see-you-now-british-medical-association-sets-up-abs-for-doctors.
190. Niel Rose, Leading Trade Unions Make ABS play, LEGALFUTURES (May 23, 2014), http://
www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/leading-trade-unions-make-abs-play.
191. Id.
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(b) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not give anything of
value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except . . . ”).
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Nick Robinson notes, the heart of the ABS form is that lawyers do not
get to keep all the profits.193
V. EMERGING THEMES, BENEFITS AND CONCERNS
A. Assessing Quality, Consumer Orientation and Client Satisfaction
To have a useful discussion of new delivery models for legal services,
and compare the burdens and benefits, the ability to discuss and
measure quality is necessary. Studies of the legal services market have
struggled to obtain reliable data on quality.194 A variety of factors is
used, chief among them client satisfaction.195 Yet lawyers understand-
ably flag the point that some aspects of quality may be outside the
assessment of individual clients. In economic terms, law is a credence
good, typically a service or product for which it is difficult for consum-
ers to assess quality.196
The United States has taken a more consumer oriented approach to
the regulation over the last thirty years, a recognition that client
perspectives are a relevant variable.197 The 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct expressly used the phrase “client-lawyer” relation-
ship in the first section of the Rules to emphasize that the client, not
the lawyer, should be the center of the relationship.198 A stronger
consumer orientation means that lawyers cannot maintain complete
control over the determination of quality. Corporate consumers may
have some advantages in this regard, but even this cohort struggles to
find an optimal match in terms of legal services. Corporate or organiza-
tional clients have complained that lawyers do not understand their
193. Robinson, supra note 12, at 1.
194. See STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 91.
195. Sociologists have led the way in studying satisfaction of users in our legal system. TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY LAW (2006).
196. Francisco Cabrillo & Sean Fitzpatrick, THE ECONOMICS OF COURTS AND LITIGATION 159-62
(2008); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Legal System, 98
MICH. L. REV. 995 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession’s Approach to Collective Self-
Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 WISC. L. REV. 638 (1983). The early years
of HALT (Heal Abolish Legal Tyranny) pushed hard on the reform of lawyer regulation. See
generally Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal market: Consumer Protection or Protection of
the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121 (2000).
198. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013) (competence); Id. at 1.18 (terminating a
representation) (2013). This nominal nod, however, has not percolated deeply into lawyer
discourse, as lawyers still routinely talk about the “lawyer-client” relationship.
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underlying business needs and perspectives.199 A cynic might say that
corporate clients only want an instrumental view of lawyers (think
Enron), but this communication gap is something broader. Lawyers
tend to have a strong lawyer-centric view of legal services; corporate
clients have a business-centric view, in which legal dimensions are very
important, but not the only or dominant variable on the table.
Lawyer rating systems, which are growing in popularity, reflect this
consumer orientation, output assessment. An idea of some relevant
variables can be derived from these rating systems. Martindale-
Hubbell, the leading lawyer rating site in the United States, asks clients
of closed cases to “assess communication ability, quality of service,
responsiveness and value for the money on the specific matters for
which you engaged the lawyer or law firm.”200 A much newer entrant to
lawyer ratings, Avvo, uses a proprietary formula to assess quality, and
allows clients to provide comments.201 At Lawyerratingz clients rate
lawyers on five factors: knowledge, communication, tenacity, work
quality, and value.202 These systems are obviously quite ragged, lack
sufficient numbers to have much reliability, and can be manipulated.
Even though ragged and incomplete, a transparent system of capturing
client satisfactionmay be one of the chief ways in which clients get access
to information on quality. ABS firms like Riverview Law that rely on
long-term contracts have an easier method of assessing client satisfac-
tion through contract renewal. Firms that do large volume, low value
claims like Winn Legal Services work to get their users to put their
experience online, with a robust reporting system that rivals Traveloc-
ity.203 Firms that are owned by interest groups, such as unions and the
British Medical Association, have their own incentive to make sure
users are satisfied. This builds stronger outside assessment of satisfac-
tion than a typical small firm.
199. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Equipping the Garage Guys in Law, 70 MD. L. REV. 484 (2011)
(describing a simulation in which law and business students worked on a joint project; law students
had difficulty understanding the client need to simplify a contract and thinking creatively about
how to meet the client goals).
200. Client Review Ratings, MARTINDALE (2015), http://www.martindale.com/Products_and_
Services/Client_Review_Ratings.aspx.
201. Review Your Lawyer, AVVO., https://www.avvo.com/attorneys/02459-ma-judith-mcmorrow-
3325921/write_review.html (last visited June 16, 2014).
202. See, e.g., Rate this Attorney, LAWYERRATINGZ, http://www.lawyerratingz.com/reviews/9297
98/Attorney-Scott-Tucker.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). See also Nora F. Engstrom, Sunlight and
Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 861 (2011).
203. See supra note 143.
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In this early stage of ABS firms, the regulatory process requires all
firms to have a clear system for clients to complain about lawyers to the
regulatory authorities—i.e., to capture client dissatisfaction. In terms of
claims, early data indicates that ABS firms in both Australia and the
United Kingdom do not have a higher rate of disciplinary actions than
non-ABS firms.204 Indeed, there is evidence that the move to proactive
systems to curb misconduct reduces attorney misconduct.205 If the
client orientation improves client services—including communication
and responsiveness—this would be a significant improvement. But
there is still a huge void in assessing quality.
B. The Power of the Lawyer “Brand”
What is striking is the occasional ABS firm, such as LegalZoom, that
could function without a law license, but chooses to be regulated so
that they can be a law firm. For these firms there appears to be an open
embracing of the benefits of legal regulation, including assurance of
quality, independence, confidentiality, legal professional privilege and
professional indemnity insurance.206
Branding is an increasingly common topic in the U.S. legal services.
Branding has many dimensions, including a personal brand and institu-
tional/firm wide brand.207 As noted above in LegalZoom, the very word
“solicitor” or “lawyer” carries with it a brand. Being a lawyer has
meaning not just within the club, but the ABS experience is confirming
that it has value to the external world as well.
Many of these ABS firms are developing niche practices, with a brand
that will stay more closely aligned with the firm itself, not necessarily
the individual solicitor.208 Solicitors who join can then be aligned with
that indication of quality, expertise, technical, and multidisciplinary
competence. This is a second-order branding.
204. Andrew Grech & Tahlia Gordon, Should Non-Lawyer Ownership of Law Firms be Endorsed
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While there is theoretical concern that non-lawyer owners and
investors will dilute the lawyer’s professional obligations to clients, the
business incentives for client satisfaction and contract renewal provide
a check on self-dealing. Regulation, fiduciary obligations, and malprac-
tice offer additional checks. A more elusive question is whether the
non-lawyer owners and investors will move any public obligations into
the form of corporate social responsibility, with all the complexities
and nuances that brings.209 If the corporate social responsibility has
bite, then perhaps there is no change in net social good. If young
lawyers demand pro bono opportunities, ABS firms will presumably
respond to that market demand.
If ABS firms move away from a pro bono or other public interest
focus, however, then those cohorts of lawyers are no longer offering
their special expertise and unique knowledge to address unmet legal
needs and improve the legal system. If ABS firms do less pro bono than
other firms, then the need for a regulatory response is more compel-
ling. It may be necessary for the regulatory systems to move beyond
exhortation to do pro bono and require it, at least for ABS firms.210
VI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of ABS form in the United Kingdom has not resulted
in an immediate transformative change in the legal services industry, so
some observers may shrug. It is apparent, however, that real change is
happening in many firms that adopt ABS form and real benefits are
emerging. These early firms offer concrete evidence that U.S. jurisdic-
tions should look at ABS structure with a more open mind. It is time.
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